



**CODE OF ETHICS
&
BEST PRACTICES**

General Code of Conduct for all LRA Employees:

- Shall not own shares in any listed or unlisted Companies nor purchase, deal or transact in shares related to entities / companies being rated by LRA. Should these shares be in possession prior to being employed by LRA, full disclosure must be made to the CEO.
- Shall always refrain from carrying on any activity which may give rise to a conflict of interest vis-à-vis LRA's credit rating business or operations, credit evaluation or management consultancy or any other activity where information acquired in the process of rating may be used or deemed to have been used.
- Shall at no time and under any circumstances whatsoever except as required under statute divulge any information relating to operations, procedures, personnel, accounting and finance pertaining to LRA, to any person or company including its directors except when instructed to do so by the CEO.
- Whether during or outside working hours or whether at the work place or otherwise, you shall not conduct yourself in a manner which may cause or be likely to cause or be calculated to cause harm or damage to the reputation and/or business of the Company
- Shall maintain confidentiality of LRA's and LRA's client's information at all times including and after you have left the employment of LRA .
- Shall adhere to all new rules as stipulated by the CEO in written documentation from time to time.
- Shall be prohibited from receiving cash, gifts or favors from any ratee exceeding the value of Rs, 30,000/= and shall disclose all such gifts or favors forthwith to the CEO. Further, shall not at any time use your influence in obtaining any goods, services or favors of any kind either directly or indirectly, for less than the market rates.

Professional Integrity and Due Diligence – All Rating Staff, Analysts & Associates:

- Shall understand that credit rating is a function of serious responsibility and any and all persons exercising the function, shall view it as a matter of great trust and act with diligence in carrying out their duties
- Any staff member participating in any way in the credit rating decision, shall always adhere to LRA's Operations Manual and Methodologies and apply the highest degree of integrity in carrying out the credit rating. Further, they shall at all times apply competence, ensure accuracy, objectivity and thoroughness worthy of the trust the function requires. Any ambiguity must always be clarified with the CEO.
- Although credit rating is a matter of opinion, it shall be reached through a formal and professional process, which is supported by appropriate objective criteria and based on information considered adequate and reliable by LRA. Further the analyst shall keep adequate documentation to ensure the integrity of the process and apply due diligence in verifying the accuracy of the information used in the rating process.
- The analyst shall at all times keep abreast of developments and changes in the economy, industry , legislation and regulations pertaining to the Ratee companies assigned to them and ensure that they are competent to carry out such ratings in an independent and competent manner free of any bias.
- The rating should only be influenced by factors that are evidenced and relevant to the credit assessment
- The rating, once decided by the committee shall be final and considered as that of the company and should be accepted as such and conveyed as of one mind and all discussions shall be kept strictly confidential and at no time shall the membership of the rating committee be divulged to anyone.
- In case of any possible conflict of interest situation, the staff member concerned shall disclose such conflict of interest to the CEO and shall not participate in any manner in formulating or arriving at a rating.
- Keep the Ratee under continuous review and make public announcements forthwith in line with LRA procedures regarding events of adequate importance that are likely to affect the rating and ensure that information is reviewed every quarter at least, to ensure the integrity of the rating awarded and published.

- Shall not seek employment with any other rating/credit evaluation company /agency carrying out business in Sri Lanka (directly or indirectly) for a period of one (1) year from the date of termination or resignation.
- Shall not become involved in any personal relationship that creates the potential for any real or apparent conflict of interest within their portfolio and keep the interaction with their clients strictly professional.
- Shall abide by the principles of ACRAA and IOSCO codes of ethics & fundamentals and uphold the responsibility to the users of the rating and to the public and abide by any changes that may be introduced from time to time.

Definitions of Conflict of Interest:

One shall be deemed to have conflict of interest in the following situations:

- Have an interest in the company in the form of ownership of shares, bonds, debentures or other long-term or short- term instruments constituting over Rs 2.5 million or 5% of the value of the issue whichever is lower.
- Have a relative by consanguinity in the Ratee organization holding a position including and above Head of Division. For this purpose the relationship shall include father, mother, brother, sister, siblings of both parents and their issues, Grandfather, Grandmother, Children and Grandchildren
- Have a relative by marriage or law in the Ratee organization holding a position including and above Head of Division. For this purpose, the relationship shall include Spouse, Partner, Father-in Law, Mother-in-Law, Brother-in-Law, Sister-in –Law, Son-in –Law and Daughter-in-Law.

**CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES**



**THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS**

DECEMBER 2004

CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES

INTRODUCTION

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) can play an important role in modern capital markets. CRAs typically opine on the credit risk of issuers of securities and their financial obligations. Given the vast amount of information available to investors today – some of it valuable, some of it not – CRAs can play a useful role in helping investors and others sift through this information, and analyze the credit risks they face when lending to a particular borrower or when purchasing an issuer’s debt and debt-like securities.¹

In September 2003, IOSCO’s Technical Committee published a Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies.² The Principles were designed to be a useful tool for securities regulators, rating agencies and others wishing to articulate the terms and conditions under which CRAs operate and the manner in which opinions of CRAs should be used by market participants. Because CRAs are regulated and operate differently in different jurisdictions, the Principles laid out high-level objectives that rating agencies, regulators, issuers and other market participants should strive toward in order to improve investor protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of securities markets and reduce systemic risk. The Principles were designed to apply to all types of CRAs operating in various jurisdictions. However, to take into account the different market, legal and regulatory circumstances in which CRAs operate, and the varying size and business models of CRAs, the manner in which the Principles were to be implemented was left open. The Principles contemplated that a variety of mechanisms could be used, including both market mechanisms and regulation.

Along with the Principles, IOSCO’s Technical Committee also published a Report on the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies that outlined the activities of CRAs, the types of regulatory issues that arise relating to these activities, and how the Principles address these issues.³ The CRA Report highlighted the growing and sometimes controversial importance placed on CRA assessments and opinions, and found that, in some cases, CRAs activities are not always well understood by investors and issuers alike. Given this lack of understanding, and because CRAs typically are subject to little formal regulation or oversight in most jurisdictions, concerns have been raised regarding the manner in which CRAs protect the integrity of the rating process, ensure that investors and issuers are treated fairly, and safeguard confidential material information provided them by issuers.

¹ CRAs typically provide credit ratings for different types of debts and financial obligations — including, for example, private loans, publicly and privately traded debt securities, preferred shares and other securities that offer a fixed or variable rate of return. For simplicity’s sake, the term “debt and debt-like securities” is used herein to refer to debt securities, preferred shares, and other financial obligations of this sort that CRAs rate.

² This document can be downloaded from IOSCO’s On-Line Library at www.iosco.org (IOSCOPD151).

³ This document can be downloaded from IOSCO’s On-Line Library at www.iosco.org (IOSCOPD153).

Following publication of the CRA Principles, some commenters, including a number of CRAs, suggested that it would be useful if IOSCO were to develop a more specific and detailed code of conduct giving guidance on how the Principles could be implemented in practice. The following Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies is the fruition of this exercise. As with the Principles, with which it should be used, the Code Fundamentals were developed out of discussions among IOSCO members, CRAs, representatives of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, issuers, and the public at large.⁴

The Code Fundamentals offer a set of robust, practical measures that serve as a guide to and a framework for implementing the Principles' objectives. These measures are the fundamentals which should be included in individual CRA codes of conduct, and the elements contained in the Code Fundamentals should receive the full support of CRA management and be backed by thorough compliance and enforcement mechanisms. However, the measures set forth in the Code Fundamentals are not intended to be all-inclusive: CRAs and regulators should consider whether or not additional measures may be necessary to properly implement the Principles in a specific jurisdiction, and the Technical Committee may revisit the Code Fundamentals in the future should experience dictate that modifications are necessary. Further, the Code Fundamentals are not designed to be rigid or formulistic. They are designed to offer CRAs a degree of flexibility in how these measures are incorporated into the individual codes of conduct of the CRAs themselves, according to each CRA's specific legal and market circumstances.

IOSCO Technical Committee members expect CRAs to give full effect to the Code Fundamentals. In order to promote transparency and improve the ability of market participants and regulators to judge whether a CRA has satisfactorily implemented the Code Fundamentals, CRAs should disclose how each provision of the Code Fundamentals is addressed in the CRA's own code of conduct. CRAs should explain if and how their own codes of conduct deviate from the Code Fundamentals and how such deviations nonetheless achieve the objectives laid out in the Code Fundamentals and the IOSCO CRA Principles. This will permit market participants and regulators to draw their own conclusions about whether the CRA has implemented the Code Fundamentals to their satisfaction, and to react accordingly. In developing their own codes of conduct, CRAs should keep in mind that the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions in which they operate vary and take precedence over the Code Fundamentals. These laws and regulations may include direct regulation of CRAs and may incorporate elements of the Code Fundamentals itself.

Finally, the Code Fundamentals only address measures that CRAs should adopt to help ensure that the CRA Principles are properly implemented. The Code Fundamentals do not address the equally important obligations issuers have of cooperating with and providing accurate and complete information to the marketplace and the CRAs they solicit to provide ratings. While aspects of the Code Fundamentals deal with a CRA's duties to issuers, the essential purpose of the Code

⁴ A consultation draft of the Code Fundamentals was published for public comment in October 2004. This document ([IOSCOPD173](#)) and a list of public comments IOSCO received on the consultation draft ([IOSCOPD177](#)) can be downloaded from IOSCO's On-Line Library at www.iosco.org. The online version of the list of public comments includes hyperlinks to the comment letters themselves.

Fundamentals is to promote investor protection by safeguarding the integrity of the rating process. IOSCO members recognize that credit ratings, despite their numerous other uses, exist primarily to help investors assess the credit risks they face when making certain kinds of investments. Maintaining the independence of CRAs vis-à-vis the issuers they rate is vital to achieving this goal. Provisions of the Code Fundamentals dealing with CRA obligations to issuers are designed to improve the quality of credit ratings and their usefulness to investors. These provisions should not be interpreted in ways that undermine the independence of CRAs or their ability to issue timely ratings opinions.

Like the IOSCO CRA Principles, the objectives of which are reflected herein, the Code Fundamentals are also intended to be useful to all types of CRAs relying on a variety of different business models. The Code Fundamentals do not indicate a preference for one business model over another, nor are the measures described therein designed to be used only by CRAs with large staffs and compliance functions. Accordingly, the types of mechanisms and procedures CRAs adopt to ensure that the provisions of the Code Fundamentals are followed will vary according to the market and legal circumstances in which the CRA operates.

Structurally, the Code Fundamentals are broken into three sections and draw upon the organization and substance of the Principles themselves:

- ◆ The Quality and Integrity of the Rating Process;
- ◆ CRA Independence and the Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest; and,
- ◆ CRA Responsibilities to the Investing Public and Issuers.

TERMS

The Code Fundamentals are designed to apply to any CRA and any person employed by a CRA in either a full-time or part-time capacity. A CRA employee who is primarily employed as a credit analyst is referred to as an “analyst.” For the purposes of the Code Fundamentals, the terms “CRA” and “credit rating agency” refer to those entities whose business is the issuance of credit ratings for the purposes of evaluating the credit risk of issuers of debt and debt-like securities.

For the purposes of the Code Fundamentals, a “credit rating” is an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a credit commitment, a debt or debt-like security or an issuer of such obligations, expressed using an established and defined ranking system. As described in the CRA Report, credit ratings are not recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold any security.

THE IOSCO CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES

As described in the IOSCO CRA Principles, CRAs should endeavor to issue opinions that help reduce the asymmetry of information that exists between borrowers and debt and debt-like securities issuers, on one side, and lenders and the purchasers of debt and debt-like securities on the other. Rating analyses of low quality or produced

through a process of questionable integrity are of little use to market participants. Stale ratings that fail to reflect changes to an issuer's financial condition or prospects may mislead market participants. Likewise, conflicts of interest or other undue factors – internal and external – that might, or even appear to, impinge upon the independence of a rating decision can seriously undermine a CRA's credibility. Where conflicts of interest or a lack of independence is common at a CRA and hidden from investors, overall investor confidence in the transparency and integrity of a market can be harmed. CRAs also have responsibilities to the investing public and to issuers themselves, including a responsibility to protect the confidentiality of some types of information issuers share with them.

To help achieve the objectives outlined in the CRA Principles, which should be read in conjunction with the Code Fundamentals, CRAs should adopt, publish and adhere to a Code of Conduct containing the following measures:

1. QUALITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE RATING PROCESS

A. Quality of the Rating Process

- 1.1 The CRA should adopt, implement and enforce written procedures to ensure that the opinions it disseminates are based on a thorough analysis of all information known to the CRA that is relevant to its analysis according to the CRA's published rating methodology.*
- 1.2 The CRA should use rating methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, and, where possible, result in ratings that can be subjected to some form of objective validation based on historical experience.*
- 1.3 In assessing an issuer's creditworthiness, analysts involved in the preparation or review of any rating action should use methodologies established by the CRA. Analysts should apply a given methodology in a consistent manner, as determined by the CRA.*
- 1.4 Credit ratings should be assigned by the CRA and not by any individual analyst employed by the CRA; ratings should reflect all information known, and believed to be relevant, to the CRA, consistent with its published methodology; and the CRA should use people who, individually or collectively have appropriate knowledge and experience in developing a rating opinion for the type of credit being applied.*
- 1.5 The CRA should maintain internal records to support its credit opinions for a reasonable period of time or in accordance with applicable law.*
- 1.6 The CRA and its analysts should take steps to avoid issuing any credit analyses or reports that contain misrepresentations or are otherwise misleading as to the general creditworthiness of an issuer or obligation.*
- 1.7 The CRA should ensure that it has and devotes sufficient resources to carry out high-quality credit assessments of all obligations and issuers it rates. When deciding whether to rate or continue rating an obligation or issuer, it*

should assess whether it is able to devote sufficient personnel with sufficient skill sets to make a proper rating assessment, and whether its personnel likely will have access to sufficient information needed in order make such an assessment.

- 1.8 *The CRA should structure its rating teams to promote continuity and avoid bias in the rating process.*

B. Monitoring and Updating

- 1.9 *Except for ratings that clearly indicate they do not entail ongoing surveillance, once a rating is published the CRA should monitor on an ongoing basis and update the rating by:*
 - a. *regularly reviewing the issuer's creditworthiness;*
 - b. *initiating a review of the status of the rating upon becoming aware of any information that might reasonably be expected to result in a rating action (including termination of a rating), consistent with the applicable rating methodology; and,*
 - c. *updating on a timely basis the rating, as appropriate, based on the results of such review.*
- 1.10 *Where a CRA makes its ratings available to the public, the CRA should publicly announce if it discontinues rating an issuer or obligation. Where a CRA's ratings are provided only to its subscribers, the CRA should announce to its subscribers if it discontinues rating an issuer or obligation. In both cases, continuing publications by the CRA of the discontinued rating should indicate the date the rating was last updated and the fact that the rating is no longer being updated.*

C. Integrity of the Rating Process

- 1.11 *The CRA and its employees should comply with all applicable laws and regulations governing its activities in each jurisdiction in which it operates.*
- 1.12 *The CRA and its employees should deal fairly and honestly with issuers, investors, other market participants, and the public.*
- 1.13 *The CRA's analysts should be held to high standards of integrity, and the CRA should not employ individuals with demonstrably compromised integrity.*
- 1.14 *The CRA and its employees should not, either implicitly or explicitly, give any assurance or guarantee of a particular rating prior to a rating assessment. This does not preclude a CRA from developing prospective assessments used in structured finance and similar transactions.*

- 1.15 *The CRA should institute policies and procedures that clearly specify a person responsible for the CRA's and the CRA's employees' compliance with the provisions of the CRA's code of conduct and with applicable laws and regulations. This person's reporting lines and compensation should be independent of the CRA's rating operations.*
- 1.16 *Upon becoming aware that another employee or entity under common control with the CRA is or has engaged in conduct that is illegal, unethical or contrary to the CRA's code of conduct, a CRA employee should report such information immediately to the individual in charge of compliance or an officer of the CRA, as appropriate, so proper action may be taken. A CRA's employees are not necessarily expected to be experts in the law. Nonetheless, its employees are expected to report the activities that a reasonable person would question. Any CRA officer who receives such a report from a CRA employee is obligated to take appropriate action, as determined by the laws and regulations of the jurisdiction and the rules and guidelines set forth by the CRA. CRA management should prohibit retaliation by other CRA staff or by the CRA itself against any employees who, in good faith, make such reports.*

2. CRA INDEPENDENCE AND AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

A. General

- 2.1 *The CRA should not forbear or refrain from taking a rating action based on the potential effect (economic, political, or otherwise) of the action on the CRA, an issuer, an investor, or other market participant.*
- 2.2 *The CRA and its analysts should use care and professional judgment to maintain both the substance and appearance of independence and objectivity.*
- 2.3 *The determination of a credit rating should be influenced only by factors relevant to the credit assessment.*
- 2.4 *The credit rating a CRA assigns to an issuer or security should not be affected by the existence of or potential for a business relationship between the CRA (or its affiliates) and the issuer (or its affiliates) or any other party, or the non-existence of such a relationship.*
- 2.5 *The CRA should separate, operationally and legally, its credit rating business and CRA analysts from any other businesses of the CRA, including consulting businesses, that may present a conflict of interest. The CRA should ensure that ancillary business operations which do not necessarily present conflicts of interest with the CRA's rating business have in place procedures and mechanisms designed to minimize the likelihood that conflicts of interest will arise.*

B. CRA Procedures and Policies

- 2.6 *The CRA should adopt written internal procedures and mechanisms to (1) identify, and (2) eliminate, or manage and disclose, as appropriate, any actual or potential conflicts of interest that may influence the opinions and analyses the CRA makes or the judgment and analyses of the individuals the CRA employs who have an influence on ratings decisions. The CRA's code of conduct should also state that the CRA will disclose such conflict avoidance and management measures.*
- 2.7 *The CRA's disclosures of actual and potential conflicts of interest should be complete, timely, clear, concise, specific and prominent.*
- 2.8 *The CRA should disclose the general nature of its compensation arrangements with rated entities. Where a CRA receives from a rated entity compensation unrelated to its ratings service, such as compensation for consulting services, the CRA should disclose the proportion such non-rating fees constitute against the fees the CRA receives from the entity for ratings services.*
- 2.9 *The CRA and its employees should not engage in any securities or derivatives trading presenting conflicts of interest with the CRA's rating activities.*
- 2.10 *In instances where rated entities (e.g., governments) have, or are simultaneously pursuing, oversight functions related to the CRA, the CRA should use different employees to conduct its rating actions than those employees involved in its oversight issues.*

C. CRA Analyst and Employee Independence

- 2.11 *Reporting lines for CRA employees and their compensation arrangements should be structured to eliminate or effectively manage actual and potential conflicts of interest. The CRA's code of conduct should also state that a CRA analyst will not be compensated or evaluated on the basis of the amount of revenue that the CRA derives from issuers that the analyst rates or with which the analyst regularly interacts.*
- 2.12 *The CRA should not have employees who are directly involved in the rating process initiate, or participate in, discussions regarding fees or payments with any entity they rate.*
- 2.13 *No CRA employee should participate in or otherwise influence the determination of the CRA's rating of any particular entity or obligation if the employee:*
 - a. *Owns securities or derivatives of the rated entity, other than holdings in diversified collective investment schemes;*

- b. *Owns securities or derivatives of any entity related to a rated entity, the ownership of which may cause or may be perceived as causing a conflict of interest, other than holdings in diversified collective investment schemes;*
 - c. *Has had a recent employment or other significant business relationship with the rated entity that may cause or may be perceived as causing a conflict of interest;*
 - d. *Has an immediate relation (i.e., a spouse, partner, parent, child, or sibling) who currently works for the rated entity; or*
 - e. *Has, or had, any other relationship with the rated entity or any related entity thereof that may cause or may be perceived as causing a conflict of interest.*
- 2.14 *The CRA's analysts and anyone involved in the rating process (or their spouse, partner or minor children) should not buy or sell or engage in any transaction in any security or derivative based on a security issued, guaranteed, or otherwise supported by any entity within such analyst's area of primary analytical responsibility, other than holdings in diversified collective investment schemes.*
- 2.15 *CRA employees should be prohibited from soliciting money, gifts or favors from anyone with whom the CRA does business and should be prohibited from accepting gifts offered in the form of cash or any gifts exceeding a minimal monetary value.*
- 2.16 *Any CRA analyst who becomes involved in any personal relationship that creates the potential for any real or apparent conflict of interest (including, for example, any personal relationship with an employee of a rated entity or agent of such entity within his or her area of analytic responsibility), should be required to disclose such relationship to the appropriate manager or officer of the CRA, as determined by the CRA's compliance policies.*

3. CRA RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC AND ISSUERS

A. Transparency and Timeliness of Ratings Disclosure

- 3.1 *The CRA should distribute in a timely manner its ratings decisions regarding the entities and securities it rates.*
- 3.2 *The CRA should publicly disclose its policies for distributing ratings, reports and updates.*
- 3.3 *The CRA should indicate with each of its ratings when the rating was last updated.*
- 3.4 *Except for "private ratings" provided only to the issuer, the CRA should disclose to the public, on a non-selective basis and free of charge, any*

rating regarding publicly issued securities, or public issuers themselves, as well as any subsequent decisions to discontinue such a rating, if the rating action is based in whole or in part on material non-public information.

- 3.5 *The CRA should publish sufficient information about its procedures, methodologies and assumptions (including financial statement adjustments that deviate materially from those contained in the issuer's published financial statements) so that outside parties can understand how a rating was arrived at by the CRA. This information will include (but not be limited to) the meaning of each rating category and the definition of default or recovery, and the time horizon the CRA used when making a rating decision.*
- 3.6 *When issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should explain in its press releases and reports the key elements underlying the rating opinion.*
- 3.7 *Where feasible and appropriate, prior to issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should inform the issuer of the critical information and principal considerations upon which a rating will be based and afford the issuer an opportunity to clarify any likely factual misperceptions or other matters that the CRA would wish to be made aware of in order to produce an accurate rating. The CRA will duly evaluate the response. Where in particular circumstances the CRA has not informed the issuer prior to issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should inform the issuer as soon as practical thereafter and, generally, should explain the reason for the delay.*
- 3.8 *In order to promote transparency and to enable the market to best judge the performance of the ratings, the CRA, where possible, should publish sufficient information about the historical default rates of CRA rating categories and whether the default rates of these categories have changed over time, so that interested parties can understand the historical performance of each category and if and how rating categories have changed, and be able to draw quality comparisons among ratings given by different CRAs. If the nature of the rating or other circumstances make a historical default rate inappropriate, statistically invalid, or otherwise likely to mislead the users of the rating, the CRA should explain this.*
- 3.9 *For each rating, the CRA should disclose whether the issuer participated in the rating process. Each rating not initiated at the request of the issuer should be identified as such. The CRA should also disclose its policies and procedures regarding unsolicited ratings.*
- 3.10 *Because users of credit ratings rely on an existing awareness of CRA methodologies, practices, procedures and processes, the CRA should fully and publicly disclose any material modification to its methodologies and significant practices, procedures, and processes. Where feasible and appropriate, disclosure of such material modifications should be made prior to their going into effect. The CRA should carefully consider the various uses of credit ratings before modifying its methodologies, practices, procedures and processes.*

B. The Treatment of Confidential Information

- 3.11 *The CRA should adopt procedures and mechanisms to protect the confidential nature of information shared with them by issuers under the terms of a confidentiality agreement or otherwise under a mutual understanding that the information is shared confidentially. Unless otherwise permitted by the confidentiality agreement and consistent with applicable laws or regulations, the CRA and its employees should not disclose confidential information in press releases, through research conferences, to future employers, or in conversations with investors, other issuers, other persons, or otherwise.*
- 3.12 *The CRA should use confidential information only for purposes related to its rating activities or otherwise in accordance with any confidentiality agreements with the issuer.*
- 3.13 *CRA employees should take all reasonable measures to protect all property and records belonging to or in possession of the CRA from fraud, theft or misuse.*
- 3.14 *CRA employees should be prohibited from engaging in transactions in securities when they possess confidential information concerning the issuer of such security.*
- 3.15 *In preservation of confidential information, CRA employees should familiarize themselves with the internal securities trading policies maintained by their employer, and periodically certify their compliance as required by such policies.*
- 3.16 *CRA employees should not selectively disclose any non-public information about rating opinions or possible future rating actions of the CRA, except to the issuer or its designated agents.*
- 3.17 *CRA employees should not share confidential information entrusted to the CRA with employees of any affiliated entities that are not CRAs. CRA employees should not share confidential information within the CRA except on an “as needed” basis.*
- 3.18 *CRA employees should not use or share confidential information for the purpose of trading securities, or for any other purpose except the conduct of the CRA’s business.*

4. DISCLOSURE OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND COMMUNICATION WITH MARKET PARTICIPANTS

- 4.1 *The CRA should disclose to the public its code of conduct and describe how the provisions of its code of conduct fully implement the provisions of the IOSCO Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies and the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies. If a CRA’s code of conduct deviates from the IOSCO provisions, the CRA*

should explain where and why these deviations exist, and how any deviations nonetheless achieve the objectives contained in the IOSCO provisions. The CRA should also describe generally how it intends to enforce its code of conduct and should disclose on a timely basis any changes to its code of conduct or how it is implemented and enforced.

- 4.2 *The CRA should establish a function within its organization charged with communicating with market participants and the public about any questions, concerns or complaints that the CRA may receive. The objective of this function should be to help ensure that the CRA's officers and management are informed of those issues that the CRA's officers and management would want to be made aware of when setting the organization's policies.*